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High Stakes, Low Strategies: 
the European Union and the Fight against 
Transnational Organized Crime in State-building Missions
How many projects failed, how many unfulfilled 
promises, how many broken dreams, 
how many frustrated hopes…
Newsletter 4, EU SSSR Mission in Guinea-Bissau, 
(November-December 2009)
Organized crime groups are enterprises embedded in a 
local social context and often operating on internation-
al, sometimes trans-continental scale. They typically re-
spond to multifaceted logics of profit and protection: 
they offer illicit services, they perform legal and illegal 
production or distribution activities, they employ coer-
cion to discourage competition, and they enjoy solid 
connections with administrative and political spheres 
(Paoli 2009). Non-military threats and non-state actors, 
such as transnational organized crime, have become 
a major question for the research and policy agenda 
on regional crises, peace and stability missions (Buzan 
1991; Lipschutz 1995). A growing body of literature 
looks into the way in which underground, shadow and 
criminal economies (i.e., the wide gamut of practices 
and actors that constitute a challenge to the establish-
ment of the rule of law) may compromise the building 
of sustainable peace and, ultimately, stability (Pugh and 
Cooper 2005; Heupel 2006). 
By the time violent conflicts swept the Balkans, the 
Black Sea region and the Caucasus, the end of the Cold 
War had already illustrated the salience of transnational 
dynamics for international relations (Rosenau 1990). A 
conceptual renovation was underway in security and 
strategic studies. Non-military threats were taking cen-
tre stage, while cultural, economic and environmental 
issues came to be part of strategic debates (Williams 
2007). European policy-makers embarked upon re-
thinking international security as something more than 
the defence of national borders (Coticchia and Ferrari 
2009). In a climate characterized by the appearance 
of ever evolving threat catalogues, Brussels started to 
conceive of external projection as key to the stability 
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Abstract
While being active in state-building operations, the European Union (EU) appears to be increasingly aware of the chal-
lenge that organized crime poses for political stability in “fragile states” located along its borders and beyond. Justice and 
Home Affairs has become one of the fastest-growing domains of EU action, and it has acquired an important external 
dimension, along with other policy ambits traditionally regarded as domestic—such as immigration, organized crime 
and terrorism. This article offers a brief overview of the evolution of the EU institutional framework concerned with ad-
dressing transnational organized crime. It then delves into EU foreign policy through the exploration of the EU missions to 
Kosovo and Guinea-Bissau, seeking to illuminate the existence of counter crime strategies. The article offers a preliminary 
assessment of how the post-Lisbon EU defence and foreign policy is conceptually and operationally equipped to meet 
the challenge posed by transnational organized crime.
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of EU borders. In other words, it became clear that the 
first line of security, rather than defence, lies abroad. 
While such a conceptualization was often underlain by 
distressingly influential representations of new neigh-
bours as regions chronically infected by malaise to be 
contained, transnational flows linking Europe’s con-
tinental core with its Eastern and South-Eastern bor-
derlands in transition often came to be understood in 
terms of imported risks that were linked to the erosion 
of consolidated and expected life standards inside the 
EU’s “area of prosperity” (Massari 2003; Kuus 2007). Lack 
of results in the fight against organized crime during 
the 1990s (especially in areas such as drug and human 
trafficking) was acutely perceived inside the EU.1  For 
example, the very moment when the EU made its first 
steps towards enlargement in South-East Europe was 
contemporaneous with the representation of post-
war transitions in the Balkans as the epicentre of “new 
threats” gaining currency. All of this led to putting inter-
national police missions (Bosnia, Kosovo, Albania and 
the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) at the top 
of the agenda.
While assisting in state building and engaging in inter-
national interventions, the EU appears to be increasing-
ly aware of the challenge that organized crime poses 
for socio-economic development and political stability 
in those externally assisted “fragile states” that are either 
part of its neighbourhood or affected by its process 
of enlargement (Wennmann 2011). In this context it 
comes as no surprise that the area of Justice and Home 
Affairs (JHA) has become one of the fastest-growing 
domains of EU action, and that policy ambits tradition-
ally regarded as domestic—such as immigration, or-
ganized crime and terrorism—have come to acquire an 
important external dimension. This article explores how 
transnational organized crime has become part of the 
EU agenda, by looking into the way in which specific 
strategies, resources and tools have been dedicated 
to fighting such forms of criminal activity in countries 
of critical importance for the emergence of EU foreign 
policy. This overview is complemented by the analysis 
of the counter crime profile of two EU missions (Kosovo 
1 Major difficulties arise in finding a generally accepted 
definition of transnational organized crime. While lacking a 
juridical/operational definition of the phenomenon (see Longo 
2010), the EU has ratified the UN Convention on Transnational 
Organized Crime (2000), which defines organized crime as “a 
structured group of three or more persons, existing for a long 
period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing 
one or more serious crime or offences […] in order to obtain, 
directly or indirectly a financial or other material benefit.”
and Guinea-Bissau), the aim being a preliminary assess-
ment of how the EU is conceptually and operationally 
equipped to face the challenge of transnational crime, 
and—ultimately—sharper focus on the existence of 
critical dimensions in the EU ambition to act interna-
tionally. 
To explore how dominant understandings of the threat 
that transnational forms of organized crime posed to 
European security have accompanied institutional 
change in the EU and the sharpening of intervention 
tools pertaining to different policy domains, one needs 
to provide a brief account of the evolution of the EU’s 
institutional framework from Maastricht (1991) to Lis-
bon (2009).
Engaging Transnational Organ-
ized Crime: the Emergence of the 
“External Dimension” 2 
Here, a first aspect stands out: as Brussels started to 
conceive of external projection as key to the stability 
of those EU borders and borderlands that had been 
challenged by mounting geopolitical turbulence (Mis-
siroli 2005), the appreciation of the transnational nature 
of new threats weakened the traditional distinction 
between external and domestic in European security 
thinking (Bigo 1996; Bloackman and Vessels 2009). The 
European countries’ armed forces, whose main ration-
ale during the Cold War had been homeland security, 
found themselves increasingly dragged into military 
operations abroad, facing a wide range of menaces to 
“national security”. Commenting on this development 
Mounier (2008: 47) observes that “Western govern-
ments no longer fear military attacks involving tanks 
and missiles but they are concerned with international 
terrorism, transnational organized crime and uncon-
trolled immigration”. Ranging from the struggle against 
2 The authors wish to thank Tosca Vivarelli Uguccioni, Emilio 
de Capitani, Francesca Ferraro and the anonymous reviewers of 
IdPS for helpful comments on previous drafts. This article is part 
of a wider research effort that focuses on how criminal enterprises 
affect local governance and geopolitical stability in transit areas 
along European borderlands. See: Drug Policy Evaluation, DPIP 
Project No. JUST/2010/DPIP/AG/1410, “New Methodological Tools 
for Policy and Programme Evaluation”. Although substantially 
extended and updated, part of this article relies upon empirical 
research that is presented in, of the same authors, “The Phantom 
Menace. Transnational Organized Crime and the Shaping of the 
Western Balkans” in Solioz, C. and Stubbs, P. (eds.), Towards Open 
Regionalism in South East Europe, Baden Baden, Nomos Publishers, 
2012. 
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organized crime in “failing states” to post-9/11 ini-
tiatives aimed at dismantling illicitly funded terrorist 
networks, the list of military and non-military foreign 
policy options soon became much wider and more 
complex than it had ever been. Organized crime was 
listed as a threat in the new strategic concept that 
NATO approved in Washington on April 23-24, 1999, 
as it was celebrating its 40th anniversary while at the 
same time waging war over the skies of Kosovo and 
mini-Yugoslavia. A few years later, the European Secu-
rity Strategy “A Secure Europe in a Better World” (ESS 
2003) expressed a distinctive EU view on “new threats”, 
whose nature was understood to be less observable 
and predictable than traditional menaces. The docu-
ment, elaborated by the then High Representative 
for Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana, lays out 
the five main threats directly affecting the EU: terror-
ism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, 
regional conflicts with an international impact, failed 
states and organized crime. 
To assess the extent to which the EU has been able to 
develop a shared strategic reflection on how to fight 
organized crime through its newly established foreign 
policy instruments, one has to take a step back and 
reconstruct the ways in which European institutions 
have first identified and then engaged with the threat 
posed by transnational crime in Europe itself. While 
by 2003 transnational organized crime came to be 
clearly singled out as a fundamental challenge for the 
security of Europe, the concept of organized crime 
as a common security concern emerged relatively 
slowly. The Treaty of Maastricht (1992) considered the 
adoption of anti-organized crime policies as an EU 
objective, creating Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) as 
a Third Pillar. The Schengen Convention (1990) and 
the Schengen Implementation Agreement (1995) 
aimed to enhance co-operation between Member 
States’ police forces and judicial systems, especially in 
the fields of drug trafficking and border control. The 
Treaty of Amsterdam (1999) transferred the areas of 
illegal immigration, visa, asylum, and judicial co-op-
eration to the competence of the European Commu-
nity (First Pillar), thus subtracting them from the area 
of intergovernmental decision-making. The new EU 
institutional framework, through Police and Judicial 
Co-operation in Criminal Matters, started to work on 
questions such as drug trafficking and transnational 
organized crime. 
It was in this phase that action plans to combat trans-
national crime made their appearance: new goals 
and proposals were defined in order to improve in-
formation-sharing across borders and to launch joint 
operations against criminal networks. A growing 
number of actors, institutions and instruments came 
to be involved and deployed in counter-crime activi-
ties, and a number of contradictions arose. As noted 
by Schroeder (2009), for several years distinct organi-
zational fields in the EU have been pursuing differ-
ent goals (e.g., stabilisation linked to foreign policy 
mechanisms, or counter-crime action and assistance 
related to distinct JHA dynamics). 
At the same time, as Monar suggests (2005), one can-
not overlook the importance of the process of “exter-
nalisation of hot issues”, such as illegal migration or 
transnational crime, for the evolution of the EU insti-
tutional framework.3  As a result, JHA, the privileged 
framework under which these actions were undertak-
en, became one of the fastest-growing domains of EU 
action (Monar 2006). The efforts made by the EU to ex-
port its own institutional settings abroad, promoting 
border control instruments and enhancing the fight 
against organized crime, can be seen as the first con-
crete expression of the development of a proper “JHA 
external dimension” (also known as JHAE; see Pawlak 
2008). At the end JHA eventually acquired both an in-
ternal (cooperation, coordination and policy-making) 
and an external dimension (incorporation of JHA is-
sues in the relations with third countries).
As a matter of fact, distinguishing between the inter-
nal and external dimension of EU policies in this do-
main is difficult, given the transnational nature of the 
issues in question. In actual and operational terms, 
internal and external aspects of the Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice are closely interwoven. It is no co-
incidence that in this area the pillar division has often 
been considered “unhelpful” (Vara 2008). In spite of 
the political priority given to the fight against organ-
ized crime, this policy domain has been constantly 
characterized by “inherent inefficiencies” (Ladenburg-
er 2008) related to the inter-governmental mode of 
decision-making. The paradoxes of “pillarisation” stand 
out rather clearly if one examines, for example, the le-
gal basis of EU missions abroad: some are assigned to 
the First Pillar, while others to the Second, depending 
on questionable assumptions regarding the degree of 
danger to be faced on the ground. 
3 For instance, the 1998 Pre-accession pacts on cooperation 
against crime targeted at new Member States can be considered 
the first expression of the externalisation of Justice and Home 
Affairs (JHA) issues.
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Beyond the Pillars: 
Organized Crime and EU Missions
 
In 2008 the “Report on the Implementation of the ESS” 
put distinctive emphasis on the salience of exporting 
security strategies beyond EU borders, preventing ex-
isting security challenges from becoming sources of 
armed conflict. In such perspective the combination 
between different political, diplomatic, military and de-
velopment instruments was understood to be impera-
tive. At the same time, however, the Report admitted 
that with specific regard to organized crime progress 
had been “slow and incomplete”. Thus, while European 
strategic documents tended to underline the percep-
tion of transnational crime as a vital threat to the se-
curity of the EU, one could also register widespread 
awareness of how elusive had proven to be the actual 
results achieved in this field over the two decades that 
followed the end of the Cold War. Given the salience 
attached to it, and considering the multidimensional 
nature of the phenomenon, the challenge represented 
by transnational organized crime can probably be seen 
as a test case for assessing how the multifaceted (pil-
larised and cross-pillarised) EU institutional framework 
has dealt with international security issues.
The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 
2009, altered the EU architecture, and represented the 
turning of a page in several policy domains. Since 2009 
the EU has made steps towards a better definition of ac-
tors and institutional settings dealing with its security. 
The overcoming of the pillar-system goes hand in hand 
with the expectations of greater coherence through 
a new Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). 
Under Lisbon policies concerning the Area of Free-
dom, Security and Justice (ex Pillars One and Three) are 
blended together in a chapter where majority voting 
becomes the rule. Thus, the decision-making process 
regarding police and judicial cooperation in fighting or-
ganized crime loses its intergovernmental character. In 
addition, Lisbon opens up new opportunities in terms 
of authorities and agencies responsible for countering 
transnational organized crime (Europol, Eurojust, OLAF, 
European Public Prosecutor).
The communitarisation of Pillar Three has been wel-
comed as a significant achievement. Some authors 
highlight the importance of the process of suprana-
tionalisation of criminal law as well as the inclusion of 
new specific areas (i.e., the fight against money laun-
dering) into the supranational level (Herlin-Karnell 
2008; Blockmans and Wessel 2009). By contrast, other 
commentators lay emphasis on the existence of several 
forms of derogation, as an illustration of the everlasting 
strength of the intergovernmental approach. The Lis-
bon Treaty, they point out, does not include systematic 
regulation of external action in relation to the area of 
freedom, security and justice, which is crucial for fight-
ing transnational organized crime (Vara 2008). The aim 
of domestic security can be pursued in the suprana-
tional framework, while the intergovernmental regime 
still dominates the realm of external security. 
According to De Capitani and Ferraro (2011), the steady 
communitarisation of the policies related to border 
control, visas and migration, which started with the 
Amsterdam Treaty have brought about a form of articu-
late interdependence on different levels: international 
agreements, European agencies, legislative harmonisa-
tion and a stable network for information sharing. How-
ever, while Schengen cooperation was gradually com-
munitarised, the intergovernmental regime still shaped 
European security and defence policy. Therefore the 
coordination mechanisms between the JHA “policy 
universe” and the CSFP domain are crucial. Indeed, the 
Council recommended more synergies, especially in re-
gions that are of paramount importance for EU security 
(Council of the European Union 2010).  
Organized crime related issues are increasingly dis-
cussed in EU dialogues with third countries and region-
al organizations. Large portions of such issues are being 
incorporated in the evolution of the EU’s Security and 
Defence policy, through which the EU seeks to better 
define and enhance its global role. Thus, while originat-
ing within Pillar Three, those operational categories that 
define the EU’s commitment to combating organized 
crime can be said to have progressively infiltrated the 
area of foreign and security policy (Pillar Two). 
The ESDP came into existence as an instrument to un-
dertake all the conflict-prevention and crisis-manage-
ment missions defined by the Petersberg tasks through 
both military and civilian instruments. The Petersberg 
tasks, defined by Western European Union in 1992 and 
then incorporated in the Treaty of Amsterdam, con-
tributed to the transformation of those European de-
fence structures that had been developed during the 
Cold War into a new security scenario, where rapidly 
deployable forces had been needed. Thus conflict pre-
vention was incorporated within the crucial aims of the 
EU. The political commitment necessary to implement 
the ESDP emerged at EU level at the Cologne European 
Summit in 1999; in Cologne 15 countries underwrote 
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the agreement that had been reached a few months 
earlier during the Franco-British Saint-Malo bilateral 
summit on the main objectives of the ESDP. 
After the Councils of Helsinki (1999) and Feira (2000), 
the key focus of foreign and security policy shifted from 
traditional military missions to comprehensive crisis 
management. The Feira Council, which established that 
the development of the rule of law in countries emerg-
ing from armed conflicts should become a priority for 
EU external action4,  proposed a specification of civilian 
aspects of EU crisis management. These were thereafter 
distinguished as police, rule of law, civilian administra-
tion and civil protection (da Feira 2000). A year later, in 
the “EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Con-
flict” security sector reform (SSR) was added as an im-
portant element for crisis management (Weiler 2009).
The vast majority of the ESDP missions (termed CSDP 
after the Lisbon Treaty) deployed by the EU since 2003 
have been civilian operations. This circumstance illus-
trates the central role of the civilian component in ex-
ternal security policies. In addition, it shows how the 
principles elaborated in the 1990s for “domestic” pur-
poses have been moved to the area of external rela-
tions, especially on issues related to terrorism and illicit 
trafficking. Interestingly, among the critical aspects that 
were recalled by the Action Plan for Civilian Aspects of 
ESDP (2004), one finds the need for improving coher-
ence between ESDP and counter crime strategies. 5 
According to the “Lessons and Best Practices Report 
2009”, the EU has made substantial progress in setting 
up and conducting over a dozen civilian CSDP missions 
(EU Common Security and Defence Policy 2009). Nev-
ertheless, critical aspects emerge as well, as highlight-
ed by the “Action Plan for Civilian Aspects of ESDP” of 
2004, which points to a need for improving coherence 
between ESDP and counter crime strategies. The For-
eign Affairs Council Meeting (26 April 2010), recalls the 
need for “further strengthening the coordination, ex-
change of information and cooperation between CSDP 
missions and all the relevant JHA actors”. In particular, 
the Council stresses the role of several CSDP missions, 
4 The European Council of Santa Maria de Feira in 2000 
represented a turning point for the development of the JHIAE. 
The main results of the meeting were the use of police and justice 
cooperation instruments in crisis regions, the external dimension 
for migration policy, the growing role of Europol in the fight against 
organized crime and terrorism.
5 The Action Plan was followed by a Civilian Capabilities 
Commitment Conference in November 2004 and later by the 
agreement on the 2008 Civilian Headline Goal. Member states fur-
ther established a Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Manage-
ment, a Civil-Military Cell, and a European Police College (CEPOL).
which “contribute to EU internal security by supporting 
the fight against transnational crime and by building ca-
pacities in the field of international legal cooperation.”6 
The 2010 Civilian CSDP Lessons Report highlights the 
need for better integrating the missions into overall 
EU policy towards the host-country and region. In this 
context, close cooperation with the Freedom, Security 
and Justice Area is described as a measure required to 
strengthen EU operations.
Summing up, the EU has acquired a multidimension-
al approach to security, focusing also on non-military 
threats. The relevance of the “phantom menace” posed 
by organized crime has emerged clearly after the Treaty 
of Maastricht, playing a crucial role in the European Se-
curity Strategy. Several actors, institutions and instru-
ments have been involved and deployed by the EU in 
counter-crime activity. Civilian Crisis Management and 
JHAE are key for the EU to tackle transnational threats 
such as organized crime. As the Office of the Spokes-
person for the High Representative for CFSP confirms, 
“there is operational consensus on fighting against or-
ganized crime in the missions which have identified 
this as one of their priorities. It is stated in their CONOPS 
(Concept of Operations) and OPLAN’s (Operation Plan).” 7 
The next section, which rests on primary and secondary 
sources, will put two cases (Kosovo and Guinea-Bissau) 
under scrutiny, with the aim to offer a more detailed 
overview of the foreign policy instruments that are 
used by the EU in the fight against organized crime 
along its turbulent borderlands and beyond. In spite of 
widely differing aspects of size, structure and regional 
location, the two missions under scrutiny allow a bet-
ter understanding of how EU efforts to address transna-
tional crime are evolving.
Along the “Balkan Route”: the 
Case of EULEX
The independence proclaimed on 17 February 2008 
marked the beginning of a new phase in the troubled 
history of Kosovo. Following the armed hostilities of 
1998-99, Kosovo had been transformed into a de facto 
international protectorate under the administration of 
the United Nations (UNMIK). At the time of independ-
ence UNMIK intelligence sources considered organized 
6 Foreign Affairs Council Meeting (26 April 2010).
7 Authors’ interview with the Office of the spokesperson for 
the High Representative for CFSP (July 2010). We wish to thank Mr. 
Juri Lass for managing the interview.
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crime “a serious threat to Kosovo”, and Western intel-
ligence reports almost invariably defined organized 
crime as “a threat to Kosovo’s society”, making no dis-
play of optimism about ongoing trends. Kosovo’s illicit 
sector proved to be particularly resilient, molded as it 
was by a history of survival and resistance along infor-
mal channels and transnational illicit trade. Trans-border 
crime played a significant role in fuelling geopolitical 
dynamics of destabilization. Central to these dynamics 
were smuggling activities through the so-called “Bal-
kan route”, which connected Turkey to Western Europe 
via Bulgaria and former Yugoslav territories: the “Balkan 
route” strictly interacted with changes in the Balkan war 
fronts throughout the 1990s (Strazzari 2003; Chassagne 
2004). Undisclosed EU reports dating from 2009 still 
mentioned that approximately 40 per cent of narcot-
ics entering Europe transits from Kosovo, and that out 
of this 40 per cent almost half is controlled by criminal 
groups based in Kosovo, and that they handle a busi-
ness worth approximately 3 billion Euros. 8 
UNMIK stood out among other international missions 
thanks to the creation of a dedicated capacity to coun-
ter organized crime. Far from being part of the original 
mandate, responsibilities were developed under UN-
MIK’s rule-of-law assistance mandate. Still, the process 
was extremely lengthy and cumbersome. It was only 
in 2002 that an investigative unit such as the Kosovo 
Organized Crime Bureau (KOCB, which in 2006 became 
the Directorate of Organized Crime, or DOC) was cre-
ated. Only in July 2003 did international efforts succeed 
in inaugurating a new provisional criminal code, as well 
as a new criminal procedure code. The first specific 
steps in tackling corruption, financial fraud and money 
laundering were taken as late as 2004 with the creation 
of a Financial Intelligence Center. One year later, a Law 
on Corruption and Money Laundering was passed (Ste-
fanova 2004). In overall terms, UNMIK’s strategy against 
organized crime can be described as following four 
lines: reform of applicable law, building of police capac-
ities, integration of local police, and cooperation with 
other law-enforcement agencies, such as NATO’s KFOR 
mission. As with the other organizations set by UNMIK, 
this apparatus of bodies and practices was gradually 
transferred under local Kosovo authorities.9 
8 Authors’ interview with EULEX Police officer, Prishtina 11 
February 2010
9 Despite the hectic activities of intelligence agencies in 
Kosovo, which kept checking organized crime at the operational 
level, counter-crime activities have been unable to expose the 
existence of links with politics. Furthermore, for all the evidence, 
stemming from investigations conducted in EU countries, that Ko-
Throughout the years of UN administration, the EU’s 
preeminent role was one of coordinating initiatives for 
economic reconstruction and development, along a 
neoliberal trajectory whose outcomes were very much 
questioned by the time this mandate was ended (Straz-
zari 2008b). Be that as it may, by 2008 the EU was able 
to undertake a different type of mission, tackling issues 
that were perceived to lie at the core of the problem. 
The EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) is the larg-
est CSDP mission deployed to date. It was established 
in February 2008 by the European Council, as negotia-
tions on the status of Kosovo were breaking down, and 
Kosovo was heading towards unilateral independence 
EULEX (2008). The mandate of EULEX is to assist judicial 
and law enforcement agencies in promoting rule-of-
law reforms, through monitoring, mentoring and ad-
vising (MMA) local institutions, while retaining residual 
executive functions.10  Fighting organized crime is con-
ceived by the EU as a premise to establishing a working 
rule-of-law system in Kosovo. Somewhat in continuity 
with UNMIK, EULEX continued to advise the Kosovo 
authorities: EULEX engaged in closely monitoring and 
advising Kosovo’s authorities on the drafting of strate-
gies on organized crime, counter-narcotics, counter-
terrorism, and integrated border management, as well 
as on judicial reform and senior public appointments. 
The counter crime mission of EULEX spans across the 
entire spectrum of activities that are carried out by its 
Police Component, its Justice Component, and its Cus-
toms Component. 
The Council appears to be officially satisfied with the 
mission’s efforts (Council of the European Union 2010). 
The coordination between the EULEX Customs Officer 
and the members of Kosovo Customs and Kosovo Po-
sovo is a crucial site for drug smuggling, no major seizures were on 
record in the region. Organized crime in Kosovo was an extremely 
sensitive topic while sovereignty matters were under discussion 
on international diplomacy tables. Within the imminence of inde-
pendence UN reports, they did not mention the term “organized 
crime” (Report on UNMIK 2007). Data concerning arrests, trials and 
seizures were not willingly disclosed by international and EU police 
officers in Prishtina. Likewise, data regarding Kosovo contained in 
the reports on the Balkans issued by the Vienna-based UN Office 
on Crime and Drugs are rather elusive (UNODC 2008).
10 As stressed by the Head of EULEX Xavier Bout de Marnhac 
“The Mission uses its executive mandate in order to make arrests, 
investigate, prosecute, sentence suspects and conduct operations 
in the area of forensic medicine and witness protection. In addi-
tion to the executive mandate the Mission is also tasked to foster 
and assist the Kosovo justice system as it strives to an end-state of 
being sustainable, transparent, accountable, multiethnic and free 
from any political interference, all in accordance with European 
best practices and standards” (EULEX 2011: 4).
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lice is considered a positive example of coordination in 
anti-organized crime activities.11 The main goal of the 
agreement signed by EULEX and the Kosovo Ministry 
of Economy and Finance in December 2009 was to cre-
ate joint teams between the EULEX Police Executive 
Department (PED) and the ministry, promoting more 
intense exchange information and providing EULEX 
executive police units with instruments to properly 
investigate issues such as smuggling or corruption. 
Agreements were signed with EUROPOL for exchang-
ing strategic data. Along similar lines the mission es-
tablished a number of technical working arrangements 
with surrounding countries for information exchange. 
Likewise, technical arrangements with financial intelli-
gence units in a number of countries were concluded, 
and Kosovo authorities were encouraged and assisted 
in the development of memoranda of understanding 
with surrounding countries in organized crime-related 
topics.
The EULEX Programme Report 2011 provides useful 
benchmarking against the baseline that was drawn in 
2009, at the time in which the operation became op-
erational. The results vary considerably depending on 
the rule-of-law specific area. If positive outcomes were 
recorded mainly for Kosovo police (e.g., organizational 
restructuring) and customs (especially the moderniza-
tion of the agency), in the justice system area, notwith-
standing some signs of progress such as the adoption 
of a new set of laws that could enhance the capacities 
of local councils), several goals were still beyond reach 
(e.g., the ineffectiveness of the witness protection sys-
tem, or the improvement of the degree of enforcement 
of judicial decisions).  As the report itself highlights, “the 
perception of the public is still that of a weak system, 
polluted by cases of corruption and subjected to politi-
cal or otherwise external pressures”.
Overall, EULEX is far from being immune to some of 
the key dilemmas experienced by UNMIK in tackling 
organized crime. Concrete results, measured in illicit 
goods seizures and arrests of prominent criminal en-
trepreneurs, have proven rather elusive. To date, cases 
of incrimination for organized crime are very few, while 
the leaking of Western intelligence reports on the in-
volvement of top Kosovo politicians in transnational 
organized crime activities keeps casting dark shadows 
on the country (for example, Lewis 2011). Among the 
setbacks which are identified by EULEX officers when 
asked about the difficulty in carrying out counter-crime 
11 Authors’ interview with the Office of the spokesperson for 
the High Representative for CFSP (July 2010)
activities in Kosovo one may list the weakness of the 
link between prosecutors and police; the difficult co-
ordination between Kosovo ministries (due to the fact 
that each of them often acts as the private domain of a 
given political party); the difficulty in retrieving reliable 
data from border and custom control for cross-analysis 
and the ineffectiveness of the witness protection sys-
tem. As with every mission that is heavily reliant on 
local ownership, limits here appear also in the “absorp-
tion capacity” on the part of local authorities. Yet, if one 
looks for instance at Kosovo’s judicial system—by far 
the weakest point—problems lie also in the manner 
in which the international community (not necessarily 
EULEX itself ) has been acting. 12 
Kosovo’s complex and unstable political scenario has 
hindered the enhancing of regional cooperation in the 
fight against organized crime and trafficking. In 2009, for 
example, EULEX signed a protocol with Serbia’s interior 
ministry creating joint teams between the EULEX Police 
Executive Department and the ministry to exchange 
information on customs, tax and treasury records. This 
agreement triggered angered reactions among Kosovo 
Albanians, who saw the agreement as a violation of 
Kosovo’s sovereignty (Foniqi-Kabashi 2009). While ten-
sions over North Kosovo escalated in episodes of vio-
lent collision during 2011, collusive forms of smuggling 
in this area were on the rise (Carvajal 2011). 
EULEX officers are aware that obtaining results by hit-
ting high-level organized crime profiles, would have a 
strategic value, and send the right message about the 
possibility of establishing the rule of law in Kosovo. Yet, 
to reach higher levels of performance in this field, EU-
LEX should lay more emphasis on the executive side of 
its mandate, which may spark controversy given the na-
ture of its key commitment to strengthening  Kosovo’s 
rule of law through assisting local authorities in taking 
the lead and take action. Furthermore, engagement in 
investigating a large number of high profile organized 
crime and corruption cases, both on the police side but 
also on the side of the Prosecutor directing local police 
investigations, even when leading to an immediate in-
crease in satisfaction levels amongst the general popu-
lation, does raise high expectations; momentum needs 
to be maintained through successful prosecutions, and 
12 For example, the process of re-appointment of judges 
on the part of the Independent Judicial and Prosecutorial Com-
mission—a US-EU-backed autonomous body of the Kosovo Judi-
cial Council established for the purpose of conducting compre-
hensive, Kosovo-wide review of the suitability of all applicants for 
permanent appointment as judges and prosecutors in Kosovo has 
been slow and falls below expectations.
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this often proves to be difficult. Finally, and perhaps 
most importantly, problems related to political stabil-
ity loom upon the horizon; effective, unconditional ac-
tion is likely to affect the political level and this would 
not go without consequences, also given the weakness 
and permeability of new institutions vis-à-vis political 
and clientelist dynamics. 
No publicly disclosed document can be used to bring 
evidence of the existence of a comprehensive strategy 
for tackling organized crime in Kosovo. EULEX does have 
a specific “Organized Crime Strategy” which is an Annex 
in the mission OPLAN. (This is a “RESTREINT UE” docu-
ment and, therefore, not releasable.)13  EULEX officers 
confirm that elements of a broad, holistic, multi-sector 
strategy that address strategic, operational and tactical 
levels are shared at “appropriate operational level”. The 
strategy recognises that organized crime is a stated pri-
ority of the EU, and takes into account the Guidelines 
and Recommendations for Civilian Crisis Management 
Missions that regard assistance to a host country in 
the fight against organized crime. Organized crime is 
also a stated priority of the Kosovo government, who 
have developed a “National Strategy and Action Plan 
against Organized Crime (Ministry of Internal Affairs of 
the Republic of Kosovo 2009), a document that identi-
fies the different roles of the various actors, including 
EULEX itself, in its executive or strengthening mandate. 
The basic understanding that emerges from conversa-
tions with EULEX officers is that while Kosovo authori-
ties made some progress, limits are still evident, and the 
international community is therefore to take a residual 
role, both in terms of “monitoring, mentoring, and ad-
vising” (i.e. of indirect strengthening) and in executive 
terms (i.e., of direct action).14  From a policing perspec-
tive, one can speak of limited outcomes in relation to 
the strengthening mandate. As of 2010, one could re-
cord widespread recognition of a need to assist in the 
13 Much of EULEX Operation Plan belongs to the category of 
documents that are categorized as “Restreint UE”, due to the fact that 
public access may “seriously prejudice the European Union’s interna-
tional relations by revealing in detail the steps being taken by the Eu-
ropean Union in circumstances which have a high political impact in 
the whole area”. See “Reply Adopted by the Council to Confirmatory 
Application 08/c/01/09 made by Ms Kalliopi Stathopoulou by e-mail 
on 30 March 2009”. Available at: http://register.consilium.europa.eu/
pdf/lv/09/st08/st08315.lv09.pdf (Accessed: December, 2011).
14 Authors’ interview with EULEX officers. Prishtina, 10 February 
2010. While the Kosovo Police by the time the Kosovo independence 
was proclaimed had already taken the lead in a broad area of activities 
related to fighting organized crime, the UNMIK International Investi-
gation Unit was not dissolved, and kept carrying out in certain areas 
executive criminal investigations without the assistance of KPS officers.
development of intelligence-led policing (e.g., enhanc-
ing the role of the Directorate of Criminal Analysis) and 
the Directorate of Organized Crime (Investigations).  
EULEX provides an illustration of how and to what ex-
tent European operations may support local JHA sys-
tems. As noted by Trauner: “[the support to JHA systems] 
particularly appeals to policy areas in which adjustment 
to the EU has not implied difficult reform efforts (such 
as, for instance, the technical upgrading of border con-
trol equipment). The problem for the EU has related 
to the capacity of inducing changes in areas in which 
real (and, hence, painful) reform steps were expected 
or considered necessary” (2009: 74). The paradoxical ab-
sence of relevant smuggling cases reported in Kosovo 
can be offered as evidence of what, following Trauner, 
one may call a “limited EU capacity of inducing change”. 
Missions prove to be more efficient in improving po-
lice or border control and customs equipment than in 
fostering effective judicial reform. In other words, tech-
nically conceived forms of capacity building and coop-
eration between executive state officials are the area 
that carries much of the water. Mounier highlights how 
“efficiency of the security apparatus tends to take prec-
edence over good governance principles” (2008: 54). 
Domestic criminal justice systems and the judiciary as a 
whole are considerably weaker in their capabilities than 
the technically upheld regional police forces.
Along the “African Route”: 
the Case of EU SSR Guinea-Bissau
The increasingly evident role of West Africa as a transit 
and storage region for illicit commodities heading from 
South America to Europe has caused deep concern in 
the international community. According to a UNODC 
assessment dated 2008, one-fourth of the cocaine con-
sumed annually in Europe would be passing through 
the so-called “African Route”.15 The seizures made in West 
Africa over recent years confirm the prominent role this 
region plays as a hub for drug trafficking. The UNODC 
reports that 48 tons of cocaine have been confiscated 
in Africa between 2005 and 2008. By contrast, in the pe-
riod from 1998-2002, seizures had rarely exceeded one 
ton annually. This seems to indicate that a massive shift 
occurred. There are several possible explanations for 
15 The Europol (2007) called “Africa route” one of the main 
maritime paths for sending cocaine to Europe: from South Amer-
ica, via West Africa, to Spain and Portugal. It is estimated that be-
tween 46 tons and as much as 300 metric tons of cocaine bound 
for Europe transit West Africa annually (UNODC, 2008).
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the development of this route across the African coast. 
Brombacher and Maihold (2009) emphasize a combi-
nation of elements that has fostered the drug business 
in the region: a growing demand for cocaine in Europe 
while the US market would have been contracting; 
tighter controls on traditional routes (the Balkans and 
Central America), and ideal conditions for undertaking 
smuggling in West Africa. According to the European 
Monitoring Centre for Drug Addition (2008), the “Africa 
Route” takes advantage of local political and economic 
vulnerabilities, starting with the poor judicial and law 
enforcement systems of West African countries. 
In this context, Guinea-Bissau is widely considered a 
major international hub for cocaine smuggling (see Fig-
ure 1). The country has earned the negative reputation 
of Africa’s first narco-state. The report of the Secretary-
General on the United Nations Office for West Africa 
(2008) highlights the existence of evidence of growing 
influence by Colombian and Venezuelan gangs active 
in the country. The deep political crisis of 2009 decapi-
tated top-level state authorities, raising concern over 
the country’s political situation.16  The UNODC report on 
West Africa (2008) asked Guinea-Bissau to fight harder 
against cocaine trafficking in its territory, describing the 
country as a strategic sub-regional route for drug trans-
port, repackaging and distribution (Rastello 2009). Car-
go ships, fishing boats and aircrafts are the main instru-
ments used by smugglers for reaching African shores 
from South America (Griffiths and Bromley 2009).
Many elements have contributed to make Guinea-Bis-
sau so significant within the “African Route”. First of all, co-
caine trafficking is facilitated by geographical elements 
such as the presence of uninhabited islands in the ar-
chipelago and dozens of colonial era airstrips. Secondly, 
the profound weakness of the political and institutional 
system has affected the overall level of corruption, thus 
promoting domestic instability. Thirdly, Guinea-Bissau 
lacks the effective capacity to counter trafficking: the 
national police have been highly under-funded and ill-
equipped, the judiciary is deeply under-resourced, and 
the army has reportedly been heavily involved in the 
illicit trade. Brombacher and Maihold claim that “one 
hundred kilos  of  pure  cocaine,  dumped  on  a  beach 
in  Guinea-Bissau,  would  have  a  market value  in  Eu-
rope  that  is equivalent  to  all  the  development  aid 
16 In March 2009, Military Chief Tagme na Wai was killed in 
explosion in its headquarter while President Vieira was shot dead 
hours later by soldiers loyal to na Wai. See, among others the Inter-
national Crisis Group report. Available at: http://www.crisisgroup.
org/en/regions/africa/west-africa/guinea-bissau/B061-guinea-bis-
sau-beyond-rule-of-the-gun.aspx (Accessed: November, 2011).
that  the  country  receives in  a  year” (2009: 13). 
For the EU, whose domestic cocaine market is assessed 
to be expanding, the development of a narco-state in 
a crucial cocaine smuggling transit area is a significant 
threat. Only if the seizures take place closer to the con-
sumer than to the producer, can the anti-drug policy 
effectively influence the final price, and affect market 
dynamics. In addition to considerations regarding West 
Africa’s regional stability (and colonial legacies), it is in 
the interest of the EU to avoid developing territories 
with weak state-structures where organized crime can 
easily expand drug trafficking and other illicit activities.
To address these problems, the EU Drugs Action Plan 
2009-2012 provides instruments through a variety of 
projects, promotion of regional and intra-regional co-
operation, and intensification of financial support. The 
Praia Action Plan (2008) provides the political frame-
work of the EU-ECOWAS technical cooperation on drug 
trafficking in West Africa. Seven EU Member States 
signed a formal treaty to set up the Maritime Analysis 
and Operations Centre–Narcotics (MAOC-N) in Lisbon, 
Portugal in September 2007; a few months later France 
launched another anti-drug coordination centre fo-
cused specifically on maritime drug trafficking in the 
Mediterranean. 
Despite these efforts, the poor law enforcement struc-
tures that characterize many West African countries is 
such that more direct forms of intervention along the 
drug trafficking routes have been considered. Promot-
ing better control of local territories, containing politi-
cal instability, and countering smuggling and corrup-
tion are all strategic aims for European security: the 
menace caused by criminal gangs hijacking fragile 
state structures, is not limited to cocaine. A Sahel route 
has emerged as a corridor used by local rebels, bandits 
and terrorist formations (Strazzari and Tholens 2009). 
Guinea-Bissau is considered by the EU a crucial country 
for the stabilization of the whole West Africa Region: “an 
instable WA is the perfect ground for organized crimi-
nal groups to spread and increase their trafficking in 
the EU.” 17 The EU-Africa Lisbon Summit (2007) adopted 
the “Joint EU-Africa Strategy” based on the promotion 
of peace, security and stability. Due to the massive im-
pact of cocaine smuggling on governance in West Af-
rica, the requests for economic and technical assistance 
have been pressing. Thus, in June 2008, the EU, in part-
nership with the Guinea-Bissau authorities, launched 
the “Security Sector Reform (SSR) Mission” (Council of 
17 Authors’ interview with the Office of the spokesperson for 
the High Representative for CFSP (July 2010).
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the European Union 2008). After two years, the SSR Mis-
sion, which was endowed with no executive powers18, 
closed down on 30 September 2010.
?
The EU mission in support of the Security Sector Reform 
(SSR) in Guinea-Bissau allows the description of EU strat-
egies and practices in SSR, assessing how and to what 
degree the ESDP/CSDP is conceptually and operation-
ally equipped to meet the “new threats”.  According to 
the official documents, the mission has achieved its 
mandate; it has “assisted local authorities at strategic 
level to develop adequate legal frameworks and basic, 
organic laws were prepared for the armed forces and 
police” (European Union 2010). The legal frameworks 
of the SSR have been prepared and approved by the 
local authorities. However, the implementation of the 
SSR and its legal framework was hindered by the “unful-
filled conditions set by the EU Member States in order 
18 Due to the fact that the mission had no executive powers 
there was no operational cooperation with the local army nor with 
the security forces on crime contrast. The only form of cooperation 
was at a strategic level with the security forces.
to continue the CSDP presence in the Country.” 19 After 
the mutiny of April 2010, when soldiers arrested Prime 
Minister Carlos Gomes Junior and replaced the chief of 
the armed forces, the EU expressed its concern explic-
itly (Lopez 2010); the restoration of constitutional order 
was considered by Brussels as the necessary condition 
under which the CSDP mission could be fulfilled. Due 
to the unabashed lack of respect for basic rule of law 
standards, the EU announced it was ending (the/its) 
mission to reform local security forces (European Union 
2010). 
The EU initially conceived the SSR concept as a task 
in which development, political stability, and security 
were consistently linked. Political instability has affect-
ed Guinea-Bissau for decades. At the beginning of the 
EU mission (which was undertaken within the ESDP 
framework), the country was facing various problems: 
corruption, military tension, poor infrastructure, eco-
nomic crisis, inefficient legal systems, and lack of access 
to clean water, health and education. The defence sec-
19 Authors’ interview with the Office of the Spokesperson 
for the High Representative for CFSP (July 2010).
Source: Brombacher and Maihold (2009)
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tor was composed of veterans, militias and paramilitary 
elements whose level of training and equipment was 
dramatically low (Wailer 2009). Moreover, coordination 
among several security bodies (e.g., the Public Order 
Police, Judiciary Police, Border Guards, Immigration 
Services, Maritime Police, Financial Oversight Services 
and State Security Information Services), was extremely 
challenging. In Guinea-Bissau, nine different police bod-
ies were working for five different ministers. The EU mis-
sion focused on military, police and judicial reform. As 
noted by Javier Solana, the goal was to provide advice 
and assistance to local authorities in order to “consoli-
date the rule of law, as well as security and stability, in 
the country” (Solana 2008). The efforts aimed at creat-
ing conditions for the implementation of the national 
security sector reform strategy.20  The operation is the 
first example of a civil-military ESDP mission; it brings 
together, with a “holistic approach”, the sectors of de-
fence, justice and police. 21
On the ground, the main priority was to avoid the crimi-
nal capture of state structures, a situation that would see 
the emergence of a prototypical narco-state in the hands 
of Latin American cartels. The shortage in human and 
material resources (i.e., no navy to patrol its waters) made 
this scenario likely. Thus, European advisors worked with 
the armed forces, the Judicial Police and the Public Order 
Police. The main objectives of the operation were the re-
structuring of security forces, the reorganization of police 
bodies (especially for counter-narcotics efforts), the de-
velopment of criminal investigations capacity, and advis-
ing the Interpol national bureau in Bissau. 
Despite the strategic relevance of the mission and the 
existence of significant contextual challenges, the EU 
deployed at the peak only 19 civilian and military ex-
perts to SSR.22  Notwithstanding such limited effort, a 
preliminary analysis of official EU SSR documents shows 
some partial accomplishment of the mission. Firstly, it 
defined a new structure and legal framework for the 
Armed and Security Forces. Additionally, the connection 
between Guinean Judiciary Police and Interpol was re-
established, and several organic laws within the coun-
try’s judicial order were drafted. The mission worked un-
20 The Strategy was adopted by Guinea-Bissau authorities in 
November 2006 together with the EU.
21 The EU Political and Security Committee (PSC) was in 
charge of the political control and strategic direction of the opera-
tion. The PSC is under the responsibility of the Council of the EU, 
and was conceived as complementary to the European Develop-
ment Fund.
22 The participating states were Germany, Spain, France, 
Italy, Portugal and Sweden.
der different Governments and Presidents, witnessing a 
dramatic series of putsches and assassinations. Political 
destabilization culminated in March 2009 when Presi-
dent Viera was shot dead after the death of Army Chief 
of Staff General Batista Tagme Na Wai. According to UN-
ODC (2009) the type of remote-controlled bomb used 
for this assassination would confirm that Mexican and 
Colombian drug trafficking organizations were involved 
in the Na Wai assassination. Members of the Presidential 
guard confessed their role in facilitating drug traffick-
ing and providing illegal diplomatic passports (UNODC 
2009). In Senegal, visa stamps in passports that were 
seized from Colombian traffickers turned out to have 
been issued directly by the Guinea-Bissau’s Ministry of 
Interior (Miller 2007).
After the assassinations, the EU Parliament expressed 
its serious concern for the degeneration of the political 
climate in the country: “the growing evidence of drug 
trafficking in and through the region shows how it has 
become a major danger to the whole of West Africa and 
also already poses a huge threat to the EU by affecting 
neighbouring regions” (European Parliament 2009). 
“Lack of commitment” on the part of the local authori-
ties was an open object of complaints by the EU.23  But, 
while the EU Parliament recognizes the existence of a 
situation of emergency in Guinea-Bissau, and related 
threats that are posed to European security, the EU SSR 
mission still maintains a limited arrangement. The op-
eration preserved its strict focus on “good governance” 
and the number of civilian and military personnel did 
not increase, even in light of the March 2009 assassi-
nations. Consequently, as emphasized by Pirozzi and 
Sandawi (2009), the small EU presence in the field was 
unable to have a considerable impact, especially after 
the worsening of the political crisis. Limits to the effec-
tiveness of such a small-sized mission were highlighted 
by the inability of the “advisor-centred” operation to im-
prove the state of degradation in the Guinean National 
Guard (EU SSR Newsletter October 2009) and by the 
lack of financial and human resources for the Border 
Police (EU SSR Newsletter December 2009). In addition, 
despite the prominence of the task in the mandate, the 
resources assigned to strengthen law enforcement in 
combating drug trafficking were a small percentage24 
23 Authors’ interview with the Office of the spokesperson for 
the High Representative for CFSP (July 2010).
24 10th European Development Fund (EDF) covers the pe-
riod 2008-2013 for an amount of 27 million euro. Only to 2 million 
are assigned to counter-drugs activities Authors’ interview with the 
Office of the spokesperson for the High Representative for CFSP 
(July 2010).
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of the whole EU economic support to the country (UN 
Peacebuilding Commission 2008).
However, despite the acuteness of the political crisis, the 
EU operation did achieve a few limited results, creating 
new legal structures for security forces and supporting 
the draft of new laws and reform. Antonio Mazzitelli 
(West Africa’s representative of the UNODC) pointed 
out the relevant progress made in Guinea-Bissau by the 
international community in fighting drug traffickers. For 
Mazzitelli, whose comments date to before the crisis of 
April 2010, the Guinean government was far more open 
to external investigations in its country, especially in its 
airports. In his view, the high attention the international 
community gave to the drug issue in the country forced 
some international traffickers to gradually relocate their 
trade to other countries in the region” (IRIN 2008). 
Several authors did not share such an optimistic per-
spective. According to Weiler (2009), the mission was far 
too modest to achieve the critical goal of EU security. 
There was still a profound gap between ambitions to re-
form the security sector and the adequate resources to 
achieve it.  With limited numbers of civil and military ad-
visors, progress was unlikely (Pirozzi and Sandawi 2009). 
As Weiler underlined, “whereas the formation of the four 
integrated police units foreseen in the national security 
strategy would have required further support, no opera-
tional activities are included in the mandate. It illustrates 
the difficulty to find a common ground between Mem-
ber States in view of undertaking ambitious actions in 
Africa” (2009: 19-20). Another misstep was that member 
states failed to modify European involvement in the re-
gion after the assassinations of March 2009.  In the wake 
of an observable case of drug smuggling-fuelled politi-
cal instability, and of the 2010 mutiny, the EU agenda for 
SSR in Guinea still remains unchanged, and the mission 
remains grotesquely focused on “good governance”. Ac-
cording to Pirozzi and Sandawi, “Member States are still 
more interested in the ‘image’ of a mission instead of the 
concrete outcome in terms of security” (2009: 15). 
In overall terms, the mission appears to be based on 
shaky grounds and lacking an explicit strategy for com-
bating organized crime; no concrete options were un-
dertaken in this direction.25  The fact that, in the time 
after the arrest of the Prime Minister by the military in 
April 2010, the US named two top Guinean military of-
ficials as ‘international drugs traffickers’ and froze their 
25 The mission was aimed on the reform of the security sec-
tor, it was not “crucially aimed on combating organized crime”. Au-
thors’ interview with the Office of the spokesperson for the High 
Representative for CFSP (July 2010).
assets (BBC 2012), confirms the inability of EU external 
action to credibly address the dramatic threat posed by 
organized crime in the region.
Conclusion
This exploration has primarily found evidence of the 
fact that over the past two decades the EU has come 
to the full realization of the salience of transnational 
organized crime as a stability and security threat. Un-
like the interpretations that were dominant only a dec-
ade ago, a consensus now exists, both at strategic and 
operational level, on the fact that organized crime has 
very much to do with the intractable nature of secu-
rity challenges the EU is facing both domestically and 
internationally. Originating, and first defined, within 
Pillar Three of the architecture designed in Maastricht, 
the categories that define the EU commitment to fight-
ing organized crime have moved to touch the domain 
of foreign and security policy via the development of 
a distinctive external dimension of Justice and Home 
Affairs. Against this background, one could expect that 
the cross-pillarisation process that followed the ratifica-
tion of the Lisbon Treaty would make it easier to articu-
late a comprehensive, issue-driven strategic approach, 
plausibly grounded also in (or founded on) member 
states’ “best practices”. Despite the emphasis placed by 
EU institutions on the nexus between internal and ex-
ternal security, differences between these two broad 
policy domains remain significant. De Capitani and Fer-
raro (2011) highlight how these two diverse regimes 
(supranational for internal security vs. intergovernmen-
tal for external security) continue to affect the way in 
which European institutions operate (and, accordingly, 
the results they reap). 
The long process that brought organized crime (and 
transnational organized crime more specifically) to the 
attention of European security policy-making has not 
been accompanied by an attempt to identify working 
definitions of the phenomenon that would allow the 
capture of variations in size, organization modes, and 
scales of operation.26  As Longo (2010: 24) emphasizes, 
the notion of “transnational” is not adopted for describ-
ing a change in the nature of traditional, locally based 
organized crime, but it is considered as a reorganization 
of traditional criminal activities driven by new oppor-
26 The European Union strategy on the prevention and con-
trol of organized crime, which was adopted by the Council of JHA 
in 2000 (same year in which the UN Convention on Transnational 
Crime was open for ratification) seems to dodge such questions by 
referring to organized crime as “dynamic by nature.”
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tunities in a new international context. Transnational 
crime, therefore, is understood as a mode of operation 
of organized crime across borders and legal domains, 
which calls first and foremost for improved internation-
al cooperation among governments. Ultimately, the 
adoption of the above mentioned UN juridical stand-
ards in tackling situations of fragile peace and state-
building in which “the local” comes to be very close to 
“the international”, had as a consequence that the EU’s 
compass would not accurately point to directions along 
which it was possible to take stock of political signifi-
cance and societal harm.     
 This preliminary exploration could not find evi-
dence of the existence of an overall strategic reflection, 
or of attempts to build consensus and general opera-
tional and tactical guidelines at the level of CSDP. Of-
ficial strategic documents regarding the fight against 
organized crime are hard to obtain for a researcher, as 
they are rarely disclosed. It seems plausible to claim 
that a strategic reflection has been developed only for 
a major mission such as EULEX, and relatively late—i.e., 
after the deployment. In spite of the availability of nu-
merous journalistic, scholarly and policy reports calling 
attention to the seriousness of the problem, and illus-
trating the need, from day one of EU engagement, for 
proactive, well coordinated, sharp-grained strategies, 
one can observe a lingering tendency to adopt reac-
tive policies triggered and moulded first of all by the 
need to show that the crisis is being handled. A pat-
ent illustration of this dynamic is offered by the analy-
sis of the Guinea-Bissau case, with the question being 
raised at the point where top state authorities literally 
engage in a shoot-out. The EU SSR mission clearly illus-
trates the gap that exists between ambitions and the 
resources that are actually deployed by the EU on the 
ground. After the mutiny of 2010 the EU was “forced” 
to terminate the mission. In this respect, one may ob-
serve that while it holds true that “there are missions 
which have the fight against organized crime included 
in their mandates” and others that provide “support to 
the local counterparts in developing their own strate-
gies” (and that the latter, having a longer-term objec-
tive, represent an “optimal solution”)27  the absence of 
executive powers can hinder the training of local forces, 
fundamentally inhibiting credibility and local capacity 
building. The complexity and the fragmentation of the 
European institutional framework, as well as the ongo-
ing search for some equilibrium between development 
27 Authors’ interview with the Office of the Spokesperson 
for the High Representative for CFSP (July 2010).
and security in SSR, affects the adoption and implemen-
tation of a coherent EU external approach in the field. 
In sum, an essentially adaptive process of institutionali-
zation of concepts and tools in Brussels is mirrored by 
the deployment of essentially reactive strategies and 
practices on the ground. The widespread awareness of 
the centrality of organized crime in regions that are ex-
tremely sensitive for European security would make it 
legitimate to expect the timely building of a more con-
sistent and effective conceptual and operational arse-
nal. 
Measured in terms of actual results, the EU decision-
making process has still to prove to be able to fill the 
gap between ambitions and reality. Fighting organized 
crime is part of wider transformative strategies to build 
sustainable peace and contribute to European secu-
rity. It takes long-term political commitment, resource 
availability and multi-dimensional strategies, which 
can cope with (geo)political (in)stability dilemmas, and 
attempt to cut the Gordian knot of the crime-politics 
nexus, while promoting socio-economic development, 
and assisting  in strengthening of the rule of law. To 
match its ambition as a global player, upholding and 
promoting legality and prosperity, the EU has far to go, 
even if steps have been made in the right direction. The 
changing nature of prevailing forms of armed conflict 
along European and world peripheries makes it impera-
tive that strategies for fighting organized crime outside 
EU borders receive more consideration and rigorous as-
sessment.
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